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THE AMENDMENT OF RULE 3: THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S
NEW RULE FOR SCREENING ORAL ARGUMENT
One knowledgeable critic of American courts has noted that
despite years of criticism, our courts are administered in essentially
the same way as they were two centuries ago.1 While this criticism
is doubtless somewhat exaggerated, it echoes the widespread view
that our courts are "hemmed in by antiquated methods and proce-
dures."2
Because of the unprecedented growth in federal litigation in recent
years, particular attention has been directed towards the federal ju-
dicial machinery.3 The ever-increasing number and complexity of cases
facing the federal courts continues to cause administrative headaches
in the form of congested calendars, delay and wasted effort.
The special problems of the United States Courts of Appeals have
been carefully documented in a comprehensive report presented to the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts in 1966.4 Some
of the data gathered in the 1966 survey has been brought up-to-date
in the graph and tables which follow.5 A brief glance will suffice to
show the rapid increase in appeals filed in recent years and the com-
mensurate growth in case backlog.
1. Address by Senator Joseph D. Tydings at St. Louis University, in 13 ST. Louis
L. REv. 601 (1969).
2. Address by Chief Justice Earl Warren, Annual Meeting of the American Law
Institute, May 16, 1967, in 23 Bus. LAw. 7, 16 (1968). Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
recently had this to say concerning the present state of American judicial procedures:
"In the supermarket age we are trying to operate the courts with crackerbarrel corner
grocer methods and equipment-vintage 1900." Address by Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, American Bar Association, Aug. 1970, in 56
A.B.A.J. 929 (1970). On another occasion Chief Justice Burger had this comment:
"[I]f you could get John Adams, Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson and bring
them back-you wouldn't even have to give them a haircut-all they would need would
be about a two-day briefing over at the Federal Judicial Center, and they could walk
into court in Washington, D.C., or St. Paul or San Francisco and try a case." U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT, Dec. 14, 1970, at 43.
3. See Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, The State of the Judiciary-
1970, American Bar Association, Aug. 1970, in 56 A.B.A.J. 929 (1970).
4. WILL SHAFROTH, SURVEY OF TEE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS, AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF ThE UNrED STATES COURTS, in 42 F.R.D. 243 (1967); WILL
SaAFRoTr, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR TBm NINTH CIRcUIT, AD-
NmpSTRATiVE OFFCE OF Tm UNITED STATES COURTS (1967) [hereinafter cited as
SKAFRoTH SURVEY, Nim- CicrruI].
5. [1966-67] Jur. CONF., AD. OFF. REP. at 149-52, 180-83; [1968-69]
JuD. CONF., AD. OFF. REP. at 174-77, 200-03; DIRECTOR OF THE ADm asTETTvE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANNUAL REPORT, 1970.
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The dramatic uptrend in the annual total of appeals is illustrated
by figure 1. In the 10-year period between 1960 and 1970, the
annual total has jumped 173 percent, from 3,899 to 10,585. This
contrasts sharply with the 19-year experience from 1941 to 1960.
During that period, total annual appeals increased only 21 percent,
from 3,213 to 3,899.6
Figure 2 evidences the present inability of the United States
Courts of Appeals to cope with their burgeoning caseloads. Through
added judgeships and other techniques the circuits have, it is true,
been able to increase annual terminations significantly. But despite
these efforts, at each fiscal year's end the number of cases left pending
has also increased.
Prior to 1961 the Ninth Circuit had been successfully reducing
the number of cases pending at each year's end.' But as figure 3
shows, the Ninth Circuit has waged a losing struggle since that time.
During the 1960s the number of judgeships in the Ninth Circuit
was increased by four, from 9 to 13.8 In addition, help has been re-
ceived from visiting district judges and retired (senior) circuit judges;
there has been increased use of per curiam opinions; and limited
screening has been employed to expedite the handling of prisoners'
habeas corpus petitions.9
Despite the foregoing remedial measures, case backlogs continue
to grow. It is generally conceded that additional doses of types of
relief just described offer little prospect for further gains in produc-
tion.'
0
Faced with the specter of constantly increasing annual caseloads
and the waning efficacy of its present tools for increasing production,
the Ninth Circuit has been forced to seek "other avenues of relief."'
It is hoped that the Ninth Circuit has found one such avenue in its
new rule for screening oral argument.
The recent amendment of Ninth Circuit rule 3 is a bold and in-
novative step. It suggests that this court should not be grouped with
those courts commonly thought to be reluctant to give up their quill
pens and inkwells in favor of typewriters.
Adoption of the amendment to rule 3 has raised some important
questions. How is the new rule being implemented? What cases are
6. WILL SHAFROTH, SURVEY OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEu, AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, in 42 F.R.D. 243, 250 (1967).
7. SHAFROTH SURVEY, NINTH CmCUIT, supra note 4, at 5.
8. 21 HASTINGS L.J. 866-76 (1970); 20 HASTINGS L.J. 854 at 871 (1969).
9. See SHAFROTH SURVEY, NINTH CIRCUIT, supra note 4.
10. In re Amendment of Rule 3, Rules of the Ninth Circuit, at 2 (9th Cir. Aug.
14, 1970) (per curiam).
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* Cross appeals and cases disposed of by consolidation have been subtracted
from the figures representing appeals filed and appeals terminated.
** Includes 42 S.E.C. cases involving a single issue and 86 tax appeals in-
volving substantially one identical question.
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subject to screening? How does the rule compare with screening pro-
cedures adopted by other circuits? Will the rule actually expedite the
appellate process? These are the questions to be taken up in the en-
suing sections of this Note.
Rule 3 (a) and Its Implementation
The full text of the new section (a) of rule 3 is as follows:
(a) Classes of cases to be submitted without oral argument, or
with limited argument. Pursuant to Rule 34 (b), Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, there is hereby established a class of cases
to be submitted without oral argument except as provided below.
There may be placed in this class any appeal, petition for original
writ, or petition for review or enforcement of an administrative
order in which (a) one party is appearing in forma pauperis and in
propria persona and will not be present to participate personally
in the argument, or (b) the questions raised on appeal are, in the
unanimous opinion of a panel of the court, of such a nature that oral
argument would not be of assistance to the court.
When a case has been classified for submission without oral
argument the Clerk shall give the parties notice in writing of such
action, provided that as to cases classified in category (b), the
Clerk shall give notice that if counsel for either side believe oral
argument is needed and so notifies the Clerk within ten days, the
cause shall be placed on the argument calendar, argument to be
limited to fifteen minutes on a side. Oral argument will be had in
all other cases, as provided in the following paragraphs of this
rule, except where the parties stipulate to submission without ar-
gument or where the court otherwise orders.'
2
The most obvious and significant purpose for adoption of this
new section is to expedite appeals.13  There are, however, other less
apparent advantages intended to inure from the rule as amended.
For example, procedures for implementing section (a) require law
clerks to prepare a memorandum of law for all in propria persona
cases before those cases are scheduled for submission. It is anticipated
that the memoranda will greatly assist the court in deciding these cases
where one party is not represented by counsel.' 4 Moreover, if section
(a) successfully reduces some of the pressure created by large case
backlogs, extended consideration may be given to more difficult cases.
15
It is also worthy of note that, apparently for the first time, all
cases will be examined prior to calendaring. This preliminary review
will make it possible for different cases involving similar or related
12. Id. at 11.
13. Id. at 1.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 7.
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questions of law to be grouped, subject to priority considerations, for
submission to the same hearing panel. Such grouping, even on a lim-
ited basis, has considerable potential for enhancing the court's pro-
ductivity.
The court's per curiam opinion adopting the amendment to rule
3 carefully noted that the new section (a) and the procedures promul-
gated thereunder are tentative and experimental in nature.16 The fol-
lowing discussion of the procedures currently utilized in implementing
section (a) must be considered subject to that caveat.
Mechanics of the Screening Process 7
Court personnel participating in the screening process are a panel
of three judges, four staff law clerks and the Clerk of the court (herein-
after referred to as: screening panel, staff clerks and Clerk). All active
judges serve on the screening panel for a period of 1 week on a rotating
basis. Three law clerks are assigned to serve as staff clerks for 1 month
per year by the judges for whom they ordinarily work. A fourth staff
clerk is permanently assigned to this function.
When the Clerk has determined the order of priority for cases
ready for calendaring, he will forward the records and briefs to the
staff clerks. The screening process then proceeds as follows: (Refer
to the simplified diagram infra.)
Step #1. The staff clerks initially study the briefs and tentatively
place each case in one of two classifications: (a) "for screening
panel," or (b) "for calendaring in due course."
Only after a case has been tentatively segregated for screening
will the staff clerk review the record. Based upon this examination he
will either confirm or reverse his initial recommendation for disposition
without oral argument.
Although no oral argument will be heard in any case where
one party is appearing in forma pauperis and in propria persona and
will be unable to be present for argument, such cases may be referred
for calendaring in due course. Because of the nature of the question
presented, some in propria persona cases are considered inappropriate
for summary disposition by the screening panel.
Once the staff clerks have finalized their recommendations, mem-
oranda are prepared for all cases to be submitted to the screening
panel. Memoranda are also prepared for all in propria persona cases
regardless of the ultimate mode of disposition.
16. Id. at 1, 7.
17. Id. app. A, at 9-10.
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THE SCREENING PROCESS:
STEP #1. Preliminary recommendation
for disposition without oral argument.
STEP #2. Unanimous vote for
Screening panel disposition without oral argu-
ment.
Finally, all cases for calendaring in due course are forwarded to
the Clerk to be placed on the normal calendar. The records, briefs
and accompanying memoranda belonging to cases selected for screen-
ing are sent to the Clerk, who, in order of priority, forwards copies to
the judges currently sitting on the screening panel.
Step #2. The judges on the screening panel independently ex-
amine the cases recommended by the staff clerks. Since not more
than ten cases may be submitted to the panel within a 1-week period,
there is adequate time for each case to receive the careful attention of
all three judges.
Before a case is submitted for dispo-
sition without oral argument, it must
first receive: 1) the staff clerk's rec-
ommendation, 2) the unanimous vote
of the screening panel and 3) approval
for such disposition by counsel for
both parties.
Normal Calendar
Cases calendared in due course to be
submitted to a regular hearing panel,
including: (a) 30 minute oral argu-
ment and (b) no oral argument for in
forma pauperis and in propria persona
cases where one party will not be pres-
ent for argument.
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Before a case will be approved for screening by the panel the
three judges must agree, based upon their independent deliberations,
(1) that the case is suitable for summary disposition and (2) that it
cannot be aided by oral argument. A dissenting vote by any member
of the panel is conclusive against screening.
Those cases failing to win unanimous approval for summary dis-
position without oral argument are returned to the Clerk to be placed on
the normal calendar. If the screening panel approves the staff clerk's
recommendations for screening, the Clerk is immediately so informed.
Step #3. When the Clerk learns that a particular case has been
selected for submission without oral argument, he promptly sends writ-
ten notice informing the parties: 1) of the screening panel's action
and 2) of their right to request oral argument.
If counsel for either party believes oral argument is necessary,
he must so notify the Clerk within 10 days. Upon receipt of a request
for oral argument, the Clerk will place the case on an argument calen-
dar for argument not to exceed fifteen minutes. In the absence of a
timely request for oral argument, the screening panel will proceed to
dispose of the case.
Screening Criteria
Due process requires that each case be examined separately
in determining whether oral argument is necessary for a fair hearing. 8
It is not surprising, therefore, that neither the new section (a) nor the
procedures drawn for its implementation set forth any definite criteria
for determining which cases do not require oral argument.
As suggested in the above discussion of the screening process,
however, there are two general conditions that must be satisfied before
a case will be considered for screening: First, the questions raised on
appeal must be of such nature that oral argument will not assist the
court in deciding the case,19 and second, the issues presented by the
case should be few in number and should not raise questions of great
complexity.20 Generally, the case which does not require oral argu-
18. FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 274-77 (1949);
cf. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936); Londoner v. City of Denver, 210
U.S. 373, 386 (1908).
19. In re Amendment of Rule 3, Rules of the Ninth Circuit, at 1 (9th Cir. Aug.
14, 1970) (per curiam).
20. This second condition is not expressly stated in the text of the amendment of
rule 3. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that oral argument is least likely to "assist the
court" in cases presenting few issues, none of which are complex. That the court did
not explicitly say this is perhaps due to its fear that such an explicit statement might en-
courage counsel to raise a number of unnecessary and frivolous issues in an effort to
avoid screening.
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ment is also the case presenting a small number of clearly defined is-
sues suitable for summary disposition. 21  There are, however, cases
which may not require argument, yet present issues that require ex-
tended consideration inconsistent with summary procedures. For ex-
ample, Ninth Circuit screening procedures expressly suggest that some
in propria persona cases to be disposed of without argument must
nevertheless be submitted to a regular hearing panel if unsuitable for
submission to the screening panel.
22
Because a case is recommended for screening does not neces-
sarily mean that the case lacks merit or that it will be affirmed, dis-
missed or reversed as a matter of course, or that it will not require
an authored opinion. Substantiality of the issues is not by itself de-
terminative.
23
Screening Procedures Adopted by Other Courts of Appeals
At present it appears that the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Tenth cir-
cuits are the only other courts of appeals that utilize case-screening
as a means of coping with increased caseloads. The fundamental
scheme of the screening rules and procedures implemented by three of
these circuits24 may be outlined as follows:
Tenth Circuit. In the Tenth Circuit an appellant must file a
docketing statement containing a concise statement of the case, in-
cluding facts material to the issues raised on appeal..2 1 Based on the
docketing statement, the Chief Judge assigns the case to one of three
classifications.
26
Cases in the first classification are recommended for disposition
without oral argument.2 7  A case may be placed in this category on
one of two grounds: 1) the appeal is not within the jurisdiction of the
court,2s or 2) because of the unsubstantialness of the issues pre-
sented.2 1 The parties are given notice of the recommendation for dis-
position without oral argument" and an opportunity to oppose such
disposition by filing a memorandum of law addressed to the merits of
21. See Huth v. Southern Pac. Co. 417 F.2d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 1969); Murphy
v. Houma Well Serv., 409 F.2d 804, 806 n.6 (5th Cir. 1969); cf. 1970 TOL. L. REV. 63,
71.
22. In re Amendment of Rule 3, Rules of the Ninth Circuit, at 9 (9th Cir. Aug.
14, 1970) (per curiam).
23. FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 276 (1949).
24. Insufficient reference material at the date of publication prevents any dis-
cussion of screening procedures adopted by the Fourth Circuit.







the case.31 Before a case will finally be submitted for disposition
without argument, a panel of three judges, after full consideration of
the record, docketing statement and any opposing memorandum, must
unanimously confirm the Chief Judge's recommendation. 2
A second class of cases are allowed a shorter period for briefing,
and oral argument will be limited to 15 minutes.13  The basic criterion
for assigning cases to this category is narrowness or complexity of
the issues presented. 4  And it appears that the Chief Judge's deci-
sion to place a case in this class is conclusive. The third class of
cases are those to be calendared in due course for a full 30 minutes
of argument.3 5
Sixth Circuit. All appeals to the Sixth Circuit will be permitted
oral argument unless the case is to be dismissed as clearly frivolous,
or clearly not within the jurisdiction of the court. 6
Cases are, however, screened in advance of oral argument by a
panel of three judges. If the judges unanimously agree that a case
will require only limited argument, the case is placed on a Summary
Calendar for argument limited to 15 minutes. 7  The number and
complexity of the issues presented are the general criteria applied in
selecting cases for limited argument.38 All cases not so limited are
calendared for full argument.
Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit employs a relatively comprehen-
sive screening scheme. Its operation is outlined as follows in a recent
opinion:
Empowered by Fifth Circuit Rule 17, the Court has established
four main classifications. The first covers cases so lacking in merit
as to be frivolous and subject to dismissal or affirmance without
more. The second comprises cases in which oral argument is not
required and which then go on the Summary Calendar for disposi-
tion on briefs and record without oral argument. This leaves
31. Id. 9(b)(1); see Green v. Turner, 409 F.2d 215 (10th Cir. 1969).
32. Letter and enclosed memorandum from Chief Judge David T. Lewis, United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, to The Hastings Law Journal, Dec. 9,
1970, on file in the Hastings Law Library.
33. IOrn Cm. R. 9(c)(6).
34. Letter from Chief Judge David T. Lewis, supra note 32.
35. ItOn Cm R. 9(d).
36. 6TH Cm. R. 8(a), 9.
37. Id. 3(e), 7(e); see Goodpasture v. TVA, 434 F.2d 760, 766 (6th Cir. 1970).
38. See Goodpasture v. TVA, 434 F.2d 760, 766 (6th Cir. 1970); 1970 TOL.
L. REv. 63, 71. Chief Judge Harry Phillips reports that the court is reluctant to
dismiss appeals as frivolous; nevertheless, excellent gains in production have been
achieved since December 1967, when the summary procedures described in the text were
adopted: "In fiscal year 1970 filings totaled 911, an all-time high. During the same
period 1,004 cases were terminated, also an all-time high. The backlog of pending cases
has been reduced from 686 as of June 30, 1967, to 489 as of June 30, 1970." Letter
from Chief Judge Harry Phillips, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
to The Hastings Law Journal, Dec. 3, 1970, on file in the Hastings Law Library.
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those cases in which oral argument is deemed required or helpful,
the third group covering those in which limited (15 min.) argu-
ment is thought adequate, and the fourth, those meriting up to the
full time (30 min.) .... 39
In the same opinion the court stressed that no case will be placed
on the Summary Calendar described above without the unanimous ap-
proval of such action by a panel of three judges. 40  All parties to
cases so calendared will receive written notice of the panel's action,
but the panels unanimous decision to dispose of a case without oral
argument may be challenged only by Supreme Court review."
As in the Ninth Circuit, no definite criteria have been incorporated
in Fifth Circuit Rules or procedures to be applied in determining
whether a case will or will not require oral argument. The screening
panel may consider a variety of factors in determining whether oral
argument would assist the court in deciding the case, including the na-
ture, complexity and public significance of the issues.42 Ultimately,
however, all judges on the panel must be satisfied that denying oral
argument in a particular case will not deprive the parties of a fair
hearing.
By way of comparison, it is interesting to note that in the Tenth
and Sixth circuits only frivolous appeals or appeals not within the
jurisdiction of the court are actually screened out for disposition without
oral argument.4" The Fifth and Ninth circuits have adopted much
more ambitious schemes permitting a greater number of cases to be
submitted without argument.
The differing tacks taken by the four courts might easily be ex-
plained as nothing more than measuring the dosage to suit the patient.
All four circuits have experienced considerable increase in the number
of appeals filed annually, but the Fifth and Ninth circuits are currently
grappling with caseloads far larger than those of the Tenth and Sixth
circuits.44
39. Murphy v. Houma Well Serv., 409 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir. 1969) (emphasis
added).
40. Id.
41. Huth v. Southern Pac. Co., 417 F.2d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 1969).
42. Id.
43. Compare 6Tni CIR. R. 3(e), 8, 9, with 10TH CIR. R. 8(a).
44. Compare:*
Appeals Filed
Fiscal Year 5th Cir. 9th Cir. 6th Cir. 10th Cir.
1965 1,073 809 638 415
1966 1,099 796 603 543
1967 1,132 881 717 489
1968 1,348 1,077 793 641
1969 1,648 1,396 868 551
1970 1,924 1,471 911 635
*See sources cited notes 4-5 supra.
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Conclusion
Unfortunately, there is no crystal ball available permitting a view
of what the Ninth Circuit's amended rule 3 (a) portends for the fu-
ture. And there are too many variables incapable of isolation which
preclude meaningful statistical prognostications.45
However, because the Ninth and Fifth circuits are experiencing
commensurate increases in the annual volume of appeals, and because
both circuits are currently employing similar remedial measures, (in-
cluding screening procedures similar in effect),46 some cautious extra-
polations based on the Fifth Circuit's recent experience should provide
a few useful observations on what may be expected from the amended
rule 3 (a).
Will the implementation of rule 3 (a) mean some cases are to re-
ceive "second class" treatment? Despite assurances by the court to the
contrary, many members of the bar will undoubtedly be concerned that
summary disposition will prevent some cases from receiving proper
consideration. Perhaps these figures from the Fifth Circuit will allay
such suspicions: During fiscal year 1970, although cases screened for
disposition without oral argument accounted for only 38 percent of all
cases terminated that year, the same cases accounted for 34 percent
of all Fifth Circuit written opinions. Further analysis of Fifth Circuit
annual statistics reveals that in 1970, cases submitted without oral ar-
gument were responsible for 52 percent of all per curiam opinions and
16 percent of all authored opinions.47  These figures do not seem to
indicate that a recommendation for summary disposition relegates a
case to "second class" status.
Will Ninth Circuit rule 3 (a) actually expedite the appellate pro-
cess? Over the 18 months since the Fifth Circuit's summary pro-
cedure went into effect, approximately 35 to 40 percent of the annual
terminations were cases submitted without oral argument. Conversely,
60 to 65 percent of the yearly terminations were cases which received
15 or 30 minute oral argument.4 8 Since the Fifth Circuit screening
panels are apparently guided in their deliberations by many of the same
45. Statisticians have yet to accurately project the United States Courts of Ap-
peals' growth rate: Compare WiLL SHAFROTH, supra note 4, in 42 F.R.D. 243, 263
(1967), with NLRB v. Local 990, AFL-CIO, Civil No. 28680, at 4 (5th Cir., Aug. 12,
1970), and Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Cas. Co., 431 F.2d 409, 413 nn.16-17
(5th Cir. 1970).
46. Compare the Fifth Circuit's broad criteria for disposition without oral argu-
ment, in text accompanying note 42 supra, with the Ninth Circuit's broad conditions
discussed in text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
47. See Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Cas. Co., 431 F.2d 409, 413 n.13 (5th
Cir. 1970).
48. Id. at 411.
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factors which are considered determinative in the Ninth Circuit, it will
be interesting to note in the future whether the Ninth Circuit employs
its screening procedures with the same aggressiveness demonstrated
by the Fifth Circuit.
Recent statistics of the Fifth and Ninth circuits are set out in the
following table:
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH AND
NINTH CIRCUITS
49
APPEALS FILED, TERMINATED AND PENDING
FISCAL YEARS 1966-1970
Fiscal FIFTH CIRCUIT NINTH CIRCUIT
year Filed I Terminated I Pending Filed I Terminated I Pending
1966 1,099 1,028 1,004 796 718 807
1967 1,132 1,112 1,024 881 864 824
1968 1,348 1,245 1,127 1,077 814 1,087
1969 1,648 1,491 1,284* 1,396 1,012 1,471
1970 1,924 1,901 1,307 1,471 1,410 1,532**
* The Fifth Circuit's oral argument screening procedures described at page -
supra were implemented December 1968, approximately 6 months into fiscal year
1969.50
** The Ninth Circuit's oral argument screening procedures were implemented
September 1970, approximately 2 months into fiscal year 1971.51 Halfway into fiscal
year 1971, the Ninth Circuit reports that 913 new appeals have been docketed and 807
appeals terminated.
5 2
Notice that the jump in annual fillings for the Fifth Circuit during
fiscal year 1970 was sufficient to prevent a reduction in the number of
cases pending despite a significant increase in terminations. Since the
growth rate of the Ninth Circuit's caseload has closely paralleled that
of the Fifth Circuit's caseload, it would seem unrealistic to expect rule
3 (a) alone to solve the Ninth Circuit's backlog problems.
Furthermore, there is also reason to doubt whether the Ninth Cir-
cuit's screening procedures will prove as efficient as those adopted by
the Fifth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit's procedure is unique in allowing
counsel for either side to request, and ultimately to have, oral argument
even though the case receives the court's final approval for screening.
Counsel may thus override the considered judgment of one or more law
clerks and three experienced judges. This is manifest "over-safe-
guarding." Surely Supreme Court review could adequately protect
against possible deprivation of due process resulting from excessive
49. See note 5 supra.
50. Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Cas. Co., 431 F.2d 409, 410 (5th Cir.
1970).
51. In re Amendment of Rule 3, Rules of the Ninth Circuit, at 8 (9th Cir. Aug.
14, 1970) (per curiam).
52. Letter from William B. Luck, Clerk of the Court, United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, to The Hastings Law Journal, Jan. 14, 1971, on file in the
Hastings Law Library.
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screening.5 3  Without this additional safeguard the screening panel
could, upon unanimous agreement that a case will not be aided by oral
argument, proceed immediately to dispose of the case while facts and
issues are still fresh in mind.
54
Under the current rule 3 (a) the lapse of time between initial con-
sideration and final disposition may be anywhere from 12 to 25
days. The screening panel must notify the Clerk of their recommenda-
tion for screening. The Clerk must send notice to counsel for both
parties. Counsel for either side may then request oral argument or re-
main silent for 10 days. In the absence of a request for oral ar-
gument the members of the screening panel are notified, possibly in
distant cities, that the case is now ready for disposition. And finally,
the facts and issues must be called back to mind before ultimate dis-
position. Regretfully, such a procedural encumberance could prevent
rule 3 (a) from realizing its full potential for increased production.
Fredrick Siegrist*
53. The Fifth Circuit has adopted this policy. Huth v. Southern Pac. Co., 417
F.2d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court has on two occasions declined to
hear cases directly attacking disposition without oral argument pursuant to Fifth Circuit
summary procedures. United States v. Ambers, 416 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 396 U.S. 1038 (1970); Louisiana Loan & Thrift Shop v. Reynolds, 416 F.2d 898
(5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S. Dec. 3, 1969).
54. This would mean eliminating step 3 described in text accompanying note 17
supra; however, some provision for notifying the parties that their case is to be sub-
mitted without oral argument would be retained.
* Member, Second Year Class
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